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1.  Introduction
A large number of recent studies suggest that privatization and the ensuing change in corporate
governance are essential  conditions for enterprise restructuring in  transition  economies. State
enterprises are generally found to be less efficient, have excess labor and higher wages, and tend
to accumulate losses (Frydman et al, 1997, Pohl et al, 1997).  Relatedly, privatization has been
found to lead to significant improvements in firm performance (Megginson et al., 1994; Hare and
Peev, 1995).
There is less agreement on whether particular methods of privatization  and modalities
within these methods yield more restructuring. A detailed survey of case study evidence (Carlin
et al, 1995) shows, for a sample of Czech, Hungarian, Russian, and Bulgarian enterprises, that
firrns owned by foreign investors perforr  best, but there is little difference between local insider
(manager and employees) and outsider dominated firms.  Frydman et al. (1997), using a large
data set of Czech, Hungarian, and Polish enterprises, find that private  firms outperform state-
owned  firms, but  that  outsider-dominated  firrns do  not  outperform  insider-dominated  firms.
Smith et al. (1997) find that foreign dominated enterprises in Slovenia have the highest growth in
value-added, while insider-controlled  firms have a higher average  growth when compared  to
firms controlled by outside local investors.  Earle and Estrin (1997) and Linz and Krueger (1998)
find no evidence of a  robust relation between methods of privatization and enterprise restr-uc-
turing in Russia, using several alternative specifications.  Similar conclusions are reached in Es-
trin and Rosevear (1  998) for Ukrainian enterprises.
In this paper we extend the literature by investigating the effect of different modalities of
privatization to insiders on the restructuring process in two forner  Soviet republics-Georgia and
Moldova--using enterprise survey data for 1995-97. Enterprise restructuring was similar in com-
panies where  incumbent managers received significant ownership  stakes for  free and in  still
state-owned companies.  In contrast, the restructuring process was faster in companies bought bytheir managers.  We interpret these results to suggest that managers'  incentives to restructure de-
crease when they perceive their newly-acquired ownership as a windfall gain.
We choose to study the restructuring process in these two transition economies since they
both had privatization programs which favored incumbent managers, making*  it easier to con-
struct controlled samples of firms. Georgia introduced voucher privatization with concessions to
managers as the primary privatization method, and only a handful of firms were sold for cash to
their  managers or outside investors.  In contrast, the majority of Moldovan enterpnrses was ac-
quired by private investment funds in Czech-style auctions, while a large second group of enter-
prises were privatized through cash sales to managers (see EBRD, 1997, Table 5.7). Our surveys
make it possible to distinguish between the two privatization methods in each country. Thus the
data can be used to investigate not only the effects of privatization, but  also the effects of the
modalities of a particular type of privatization - privatization with concessions to insiders - on
subsecquent  enterprise performance.
An additional reason for focusing on Georgia and Moldova was the comparability of the
survey  nrmethodology,  as both surveys were cornducted  by the author as inputs in World Bank pri-
vate sector reviews.  Finally, the two countries have much in common in terms of their external
(to the firm) envrironment.  The early part of the transition period was marked  by either civil war
(Georgia) or ethnic tensions  (Moldova) which  stopped the production process  in many enter-
prises, and resulted in the cessation of large industnral regions (Abhasia in Georgia; Transnistria
in Moldova) and the related loss of supplier and customer networks. Both countries also cut off
economic relations with Russia during part of the transition period.  These negative shocks made
the restructuring process all the more difficult and necessary.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 suggests some indicators of enterprise re-
structuring and discusses  the relevant literature on its determinants in transition economies.  Sec-
tion 3 describes the survey methodology and the data sample.  Section 4 details the regression
analysis and provides interpretation of the main findings.  Section 5 concludes.
22.  Enterprise Restructuring and Its Determinants
The empirical literature on enterprise behavior during transition utilizes a wide array of
restructuring  measures, based  either  on  accounting or  qualitative  information.  There  is  no
prevalent methodology, as the concept of restructuring differs across studies.  For the purposes of
this paper, we define restructuring as changes in operations, interactions, and motivation towards
success in a changing market environment.  This definition captures the essence of restructuring
changes, some which will be forced by the behavior of other market players, while others will be
pursued by management and owners. Restructuring in this context can lead to two different out-
comes.  Viable firms would increase their productivity and market share, attract more resources,
and upgrade their production process.  At the opposite, non-viable firms would shrink to a viable
core or close down altogether.  Their assets (both human and capital) could be used for alterna-
tive production.  Thus the decline in business activity of an enterprise need not be  associated
with a lack of restructuring.  It is part of the general movement of resources to more productive
uses.
Following on this definition, we use three complementary measures of restructuring: in-
creases in labor productivity (sales per worker growth), assets sales, and renovations at the fac-
tory to improve working conditions. The first measure is based on accounting data and is most
often used  in previous  empirical  work  (Frydman et  al,  1997; Pohl  et  al.,  1997; Estrin  and
Rosevear, 1998) as it depends on both "defensive" or "passive"  restructuring (reduction in ex-
cess employment), and on "active" restructuring (increase in sales volume).'  The measure may,
however, be misleading  since substantial improvements in labor productivity need not  arise
from "pro-active" restructuring, particularly when it is accompanied by a substantial drop in out-
put.  Instead, labor productivity growth may simply account for a low initial level of efficiency,
i.e., for the elimination of waste.
I A better measure,  and one which is used in studies  of developed  countries,  is the change in total factor  productiv-
ity. This measure  depends,  however,  on the proper accounting  of fixed assets and its use is problematic  in econo-
mies  like Georgia  and Moldova  which  have experienced  high inflationary  periods.
3We hence use two other measures of active restructuring (asset sales and minor renova-
tions).  Both measures (along with positive real investment, changes in management, suppliers,
customers, etc.) can be argued to be highly correlated with restructuring.  As discrete variables,
however, they diminish  the information on restructuring across firms and are cruder than ac-
counting measures.  For example, what do different types of minor renovations reveal about the
willingness for restructuring? Does it matter how much revenue the enterprise received from as-
set sales? Were asset sales just another form of asset stripping?  These questions are difficult as
managers (understandably) are not forthcoming with their answers.
In a previous version of the paper, we also used the share of barter and the change in sup-
pliers as indicators of restructuring.  The argument made was that barter was associated with sig-
nificant costs to enterprises and a high share of barter implied efficiency losses (Hendley et al.,
1997). Linz and Krueger (1998), however, use barter as an indicator of the ability of managers to
maneuver, manipulate, and survive, by maintaining their enterprise in operations. In the absence
of a consensus on the appropriateness of this measure, we drop it from the analysis. The data on
supplier changes could not  distinguish between changes made purposefully by managers, and
changes forced by external circumstances. For example, many supplier-customer relations were
cut off during the early transition period, as stated in the previous section.  We hence exclude this
measure from the current analysis.
The  relation  between  enterprise  restructuring  and  insider  privatization  in  transition
economies has been the focus of recent theoretical models  (Bolton and Von Thadden,  1995;
Blanchard and Aghion, 1996). These papers argue that privatization to insiders may be beneficial
to restructuring since it aligns control and property rights.  Also, if incumbent managers (now
owners) cannot adequately deal with restructuring, they have the right incentives to sell (part of)
the firm to outsiders who can, or to hire other managers.  Depending on the details of the insider
privatization, there may however be a wedge between the value of the firm to insiders and the
value of the firmn  to outsiders.  That may prevent desirable restructuring from taking place.
4There is, however, no theoretical ar  empirical literature that  distinguishes between the
modalities of privatization to insiders, and their effect on enterprise restructuring.  In principle,
two modalities exist: a sale to incumbent managers (for the purposes of this paper we do not con-
sider employee ownership) or a voucher scheme with concessions to managers that leaves the
firms in their control, without any cash sale.  A third modality (discussed in Boycko, Shleifer,
and Vishny, 1995) is voucher privatization that leaves ownership in the hands of private invest-
ment funds, where the de facto  control stays in the hands of managers  as investment funds are
either unable or incapable of monitoring.  The Modlovan voucher-privatization program is a case
in point - although investment funds were formed and acquired significant ownership stakes as
early as 1994, they could not exercise control until 1997due to lack of legal rules on monitoring
of privatized firms by their Board of Directors.  Managers of such enterprises were thus able to
retain control in the absence of property rights enforcement.  The main focus of this paper is to
investigate the relation between enterprise restructuring and privatization to insiders.  We distin-
guish two types of insider privatization: voucher programs where managers receive large owner-
ship stakes for free (Georgia) or which result in de facto  control by managers (Moldova); and
management buy-outs.  The working hypothesis is that both types of privatization result in simi-
lar restructuring efforts, as managers maximize profits to their own benefit.
In addition to privatization, the literature on the microeconomics of transition identifies
two other key determinants of enterprise restructuring. One stylized fact suggests that the impo-
sition of hard budget constraints - elimination of easy access to bank lending - is necessary to
ensure adjustments in management behavior.  Without hard budget constraints, it may be rational
for managers to spend more time lobbying the govermment  for further support rather than under-
take painful restructuring measures.  The empirical evidence suggests that "enterprises subjected
to  financial discipline  show more aggressive collection of receivables,  a  closer link between
profitability and investment, and a reorientation of goals from output targets to profits" (World
Bank, 1996, p.45).
A second stylized  fact suggests that competition in the final product  market enhances
corporate restructuring (Nickell, 1996). Djankov and Hoekman (1998) use a large panel of Bul-
5garian manufacturing firms to show that import competition has some positive effect on produc-
tivity growth, but it was more than offset by the effects of (successful) lobbying for credits by the
affected firns.  Market structure is found to have a significant effect on productivity changes -
the study shows increased productivity for firms in sectors which experienced a large number of
entries either through spin-offs from existing companies or through start-ups.  A recent study of
Russian manufacturing firms in the period  1992-94 (Earle and Estrin, 1997)  found a positive
correlation between import competition and several enterprise adjustment indicators (labor pro-
ductivity, total layoffs, new product lines).  At a more aggregate level, a study of Polish indus-
tries  in 1991-93 (Falk et al, 1996) finds that total factor productivity growth was positively asso-
ciated with import penetration ratios and negatively associated with sectoral concentration.
We use these stylized facts to construct control variables in the regression analysis.  In
particular, we use firm-specific information on access to financing and competitive pressures to
purge the effect of the extemal environment on firm restructuring.  This will likely alleviate the
bias in our estimates of the effect of privatization and different privatization methods on restruc-
turing.
3,  The Surveys
To study the relation between modalities of privatization to insiders  and enterprise re-
structuring, a stratified random survey of 92 manufacturing finrs  in Georgia and 149 manufac-
turing firms in Moldova was conducted in the autumn of 1997. Most enterprises included in the
study went through some type of privatization, even though in some cases the state still has par-
tial  ownership. The Questionnaire was designed by the author, following a pilot phase  dunrng
which a dozen enterprises were visited in each country. During these visits, detailed interviews
with the general directors, financial directors, and marketing and sales directors of the companies
were conducted to document the process of restructuring.  The pilot  survey also revealed that
managers were sensitive to the confidentiality of the data.  All questionnaires hence featured an
introductory section explaining that the results of the survey would only be used in an aggregated
form in cross-country studies on the development of the private sector in the forner  Soviet Un-
ion.  Managers were also presented with  copies of an earlier study by the author (Pohl et al,
61997) which used similar surveys to analyze the effects of privatization in Central and Eastern
European transition economies.  The questionnaire was offered to general managers in Georgian
(Modlovan respectively) and Russian, as a number of directors in both countries were still ethnic
Russians and did not use the local language.
The survey in Georgia covered only enterprises located in Tbilisi (the capital city).  This
was because the Georgian Statistical Office (our counterpart in the survey) did not have regional
branches and could not conduct the survey without large travel-related expenses.  Since 72% of
all manufacturing activity in Georgia in 1997 was concentrated in Tbilisi, the representativeness
of the sample was not discredited significantly.  The selection of enterprises in the main survey
was based on the 1996 census of manufacturing firms in Tbilisi which covered 5,543 business
entities.  We chose only enterprises which reported more than 25 employees in  1991, i.e., we do
not cover small enterprises or new private firms that started operations  following 1991.  This
category comprised of  1,326 firms.  We then calculated the number of firms in each manufac-
turing sector as a share of the sub-sample.  We next multiplied this  share by  100 (the desired
sample size for the survey) to come to the target number of firms in each manufacturing sector.
This process was designed to  ensure a distribution of the enterprises in the survey sample that
was representative of the industry mix in Tbilisi.
One hundred  questionnaires were  hand-delivered to  General  Directors  in  September,
1997. The survey team re-visited the enterprises in the first week of November,  1997 and col-
lected the responses.  In four cases the General Manager was either on sick leave or a business
trip.  Four other questionnaires were left unanswered since the enterprises were closed down and
we excluded them from the subsequent analysis.  The total number of surveys included in the
analysis was 92.  The survey asked managers to identify the main sector of activity of their en-
terprise.  More than a third of all enterprises were in the food and beverage sector (35), the next
largest sectors were apparel (13), and industrial machinery (13).  The rest of the sample came
from metals (9), chemicals (7), construction materials (6), pharmaceuticals (5), and wood and
furniture (4).
7The enterprise  sample in Moldova was built  from the database  of all former and still
state-owned enterprises complied by the Ministry of Economy (our counterpart) in March 1997.
1he database  comprised about  800 companies located throughout Moldova,  including in  the
T  ransnistria region.  We used the methodology described for the Georgian sample to  select a
smnaller  group of enterprises which was representative of the overall distribution of economic ac-
Eivity across manufacturing sectors. Letters with the questionnaire were sent to  320 companies
(excluding companies in Transnistria).  Those were followed by phone  calls and  some on-site
visits.  in total, about half of the companies (149) answered the questionnaire. Most companies
wvere  located in Kishinev (113), with some companies from other regional centers: Balti (14), So-
roca (12), Drochia (4), Nisporeni (4), and Dobrugea (2).  As in the Georgian sample, the largest
iiuinber of companies (38) came from the food and beverage sector, followed by textiles and ap-
parel (25), and machinery (24).  The rest of the sample consisted of companies in the construc-
lion imaterials  (18), metals (15), chemicals (12), pharmaceuticals (9), and wood and furniture (8)
sectors.
The data from the collected surveys were then entered in spreadsheets by our counterpart
anencies and sent to the World Bank for further analysis.  In both sample, a number of managers
had given implausible (for example, profit rate of 120% of sales) or incomplete answers.  Given
l!.  already small size of the samples, we chose to carry on further phone interviews with those
ianiagers  and attempt to clarify their reports rather than exclude the companies from the surveys.
This approach may have introduced some bias in the survey, to the extent that the data on those
firrmis  were subject to more scrutiny and corrections. Since there were no other reliable sources of
inrduLstrial  data in  either Georgia or Moldova to make comparisons possible  at the time of our
sLurveys,  we could not conjecture which way the bias would have gone.
We first study the ownership structure of the sampled firms.  We distinguish between two
eroups of privatized firms, since the primary focus is on the differences between firms bought by
mna.agers,  and firms which were either given to managers for free or were defacto  controlled by
i-ailagers since ownership was not exercised (Table 1). Only a tenth of the firms in the Georgian
,;arple  can be classified as management buy-outs (MBOs), while about a quarter of the firms in
8the Moldovan sample are MBOs.  Note, however, that the ownership structure in each country is
not significantly different between MBOs and voucher-privatized firms.  This is especially true
in  Georgia, where  the  enterprises belonging  to  the  former group  actually  have  lesser  share
(54.3% as compared to 59.7%) of management ownership. There is a larger difference in man-
agement ownership of privatized firms in the Moldova sample (37.8% vs. 17.6%). If one were to
sum up the ownership stakes by managers and employees, as suggested in Blanchard and Aghion
(1996), the ownership structure of the two groups of privatized firms in Moldova becomes very
similar.
Table 1: Ownership Structure of the Sample Firms
The  shares  are unweighted  averages.  State ownership  includes  property  under  local  and  municipal  admini-
strations.  Outside  Local  Investors  include  investment  funds.
Country  Number  Managers  Employees  The State  Outside Lo-  Outside For-  Individuals
of Firms  cal Investors  eign Inves-
tors
Georgia
State  8  0.0  0.0  100.0  0.0  0.0  0.0
MBOs  9  54.3  2.6  8.6  25.6  0.4  8.5
Vouchers  75  59.7  9.1  12.8  16.9  0.6  0.9
Moldova
State  12  0.0  0.0  100.0  0.0  0.0  0.0
MBOs  33  37.8  5.2  19.4  20.7  4.3  12.6
Vouchers  104  17.6  21.6  16.9  34.8  1.9  7.2
Source:  Own  calculations.
The lack of substantial variations in the stakes held by insiders in MBOs and voucher-
privatized companies is helpful in the empirical analysis, as it can be used to argue that the dif-
ferences in the degree of restructuring between the two groups of firms (were we to find such dif-
ferences) are primarily due to the method of privatization and not to the concentration of control
that resulted from the privatization process.  There has been significant evidence in both transi-
tion and market economies that shows that the level of ownership concentration may in itself be
an important determinant of the speed of productivity growth.
We next compare the unweighted averages of the three restructuring indicators suggested
in Section 2 across the types of company ownership in each country (Table 2). We choose to
consider unweighted averages since this method removes the bias that may arise from comparing
enterprises with  different  sizes (either measured by  the value of total  assets or employment).
9One immediate pattern discernible in these simple statistics is the superior restructuring effort in
firms privatized through MBOs. In both samples, companies bought by their managers outper-
form state-owned and voucher-privatized firms on all three restructuring indicators. In particular,
MBO  firms  in  Georgia have higher  sales per  worker growth  (22.3%) than  state  (19.1%) or
voucher-privatized (18.9%) firms; have a higher percentage of sales of assets (44.2% vs. 15.3%
and 16.6% for state-owned and voucher firms respectively); and have twice as many instances of
minor renovations taking place (44.2% vs. 18.9% and 20.3%).  The differences in the latter two
indicators are statistically significant (using F-tests) at the 5% level.  MBO firms in Moldova
show on average twice as rapid restructuring on all indicators, and those differences are always
statistically significant.
Table 2: Measures of Restructuring
(unweighted averages)
Country  Sales per Worker  Sale of Assets  Minor Renovations
Growth, p.a. 1995-97  (% of enterprises)  (% of enterprises)
Georgia
State  19.1  15.3  18.9
MBOs  22.3  44.2  44.2
Vouchers  18.9  16.6  20.3
Moldova
State  8.2  16.2  27.1
MBOs  13.8  36.5  51.7
Vouchers  8.6  18.8  26.0
Source:  Own  calculations.
While indicative, the results in Table 2 are still incomplete as they fail to take into ac-
count some other factors that may influence the speed of restructuring.  For example, firms pri-
vatized through  MBOs may be  operating in industries that have higher  growth opportunities;
such firms may also have access to better financing, or may start from an advantageous initial
level of productivity.  While the latter one is possible, it does not necessary have to affect the
three performance indicators we study.  For example, while it may be  conceivable that firms
which start from better productivity levels could also show faster productivity improvements, it
is more difficult to argue that better firms would need to sell more assets or renovate.  In other
words, while firms bought out by their managers may be the better firns  initially there is no rea-
10son why they should  undergo more  changes unless  the  drive for restructuring  is  more pro-
nounced.
There are, however, two other possibilities to explain their superior perforrnance.  First,
they may be in industries where competition is less fierce, either because of barriers to entry or
because of previous monopoly positions.  Managers are likely to buy such firms as they see their
profit potential.  Secondly, MBO firns  may have credit channels that are unavailable to other
types of firms.  This may be the case as they are the only firms which have stable ownership and
their owners may take on additional credit.  What may explain the results in Table 2 is not a su-
perior restructuring effort but better financing.
To ensure unbiased estimates for the main variable of interest (the type of insider privati-
zation), we include controls for both access to  financing and competition  in the final product
market.  They are based on survey questions and are discrete in nature.  The proxy for access to
financing is 1 if the manager answered positively to the question "Have you received any exter-
nal financing in the last year?", 0 otherwise. The proxy for market power is 1 if the general man-
ager answered positively to the question "Are you a dominant player in the market for your main
product among a number with other smaller players?," 0 otherwise. Both proxies  can be criti-
cized as being subjective and poorly defined.  We include them in the analysis as they only serve
to reduce the omitted-variable bias, and we do not offer interpretations of their coefficient esti-
mates.
4.  Empirical Evidence
In this section we use simple regression analysis to study the relation between enterprise
restructuring and modalities of insider privatization.  We look at all three measures of enterprise
restructuring detailed in  Table  2. Dummies are used for management  buy-outs  and voucher-
privatized firms, with state-owned firns  being the numeraire. Georgia is used as the numeraire
country. The results show an interesting pattern: privatization through management buy-outs is
positively  associated  with  enterprise restructuring, while voucher privatized  firms do not  re-
structure more rapidly than still state-owned firms (Table 3).  This result carries through for all
11three restructuring indicators, and is particularly strong  for asset sales and minor renovations,
where the magnitudes of the coefficient estimates (0.182 and 0.211 respectively) suggest that
management-bought firms restructure twice as fast as state-owned or voucher-privatized finns.
How can one explain the positive association between enterprise restructuring and man-
agement buy-outs, on the one hand, and the lack of association between enterprise restructuring
and voucher privatization,  on the other?  One interpretation may come  from the literature  on
windfall income through bequests, lottery winnings, or sudden increases in social security bene-
fits in the United States (see Wilcox, 1989 for a summary). These studies find that windfall in-
come is consumed faster than earned income, as its recipients include only a small fraction of the
windfall in the financial planning of their future. In the privatization context, this would imply
that managers who  gain ownership for  free (either through  vouchers  or  indirectly  when the
voucher scheme results in lack of monitoring) may have less incentives to restructure, as their
income is not solely based on the success of the enterprise.  In contrast, managers who bought
their enterprises perforrn better as their fortunes are connected entirely to the profits that the en-
terprise generates.
An altemative explanation is that enterprises bought out by their managers were better
enterprises to start with.  That is to say, MBOs are the result of "cherry-picking" during the pri-
vatization process.  This argument has been put forward in Frydman et al. (1997) for a sample of
Central European firms.  It fails to explain, however, why such firms would need to sell assets or
renovate, as is the case with the enterprises in our study. The "cherry-picking" hypothesis would
have to be augmented by arguing that those were better enterprises which also had smarter, more
motivated managers.  It is then not obvious why such managers did not acquire their enterprises
the smarter way - through voucher pnivatizations.  Without further analysis, the answers are not
comprehensive.
12Table 3: OLS Estimation Results
(Coefficient, t-Statistics)
Explanatory Variable  Productivity  Asset Sales  Renovations
Number of Observations  241  241  241
Management Buy-Outs  0.036*  0.182*  0.21 1*
(2.335)  (5.627)  (4.277)
Voucher Privatization  0.009  0.079  -0.042
(0.612)  (1.224)  (-0.358)
Access to Financing  0.035*  -0.096*  0.124*
(3.421)  (-2.518)  (3.663)
Market Power  0.016*  0.062  0.102
(2.514)  (1.549)  (1.821)
Food and Beverage  0.024*  0.142*  0.081*
(2.574)  (6.285)  (2.562)
Textiles and Apparel  -0.045*  0.031  -0.062
(-2.226)  (1.451)  (-1.074)
Wood and Fumiture  -0.011  -0.082  0.088
(-1.368)  (-1.204)  (1.622)
Construction Materials  0.051*  0.012  -0.037
(3.424)  (0.688)  (1.627)
Chemicals  -0.022  -0.122  -0.012
(-1.877)  (-1.079)  (-1.405)
Pharmaceuticals  -0.041  -0.098  0.049*
(-1.687)  (-0.496)  (3.258)
Metals  -0.101*  -0.117*  -0.128*
(-3.882)  (-12.986)  (2.056)
Moldova Country Dunny  -0.062*  0.021  0.054*
(4.82)  (1.124)  (2.641)
Adjusted R
2 _  0.245  0.152  0.207
Notes: The numeraire  sector  is Industrial  Machinery. Standard  errors  are
heteroskedasticity-consistent.  A constant  term is included  in all regressions.
Access to bank  financing proves  to be  another significant explanatory variable of re-
structuring.  It serves to increase productivity growth and the probability of renovations, but is
negatively correlated with asset sales. The latter finding can be interpreted to suggest that asset
sales are a substitute for access to bank financing. Having a higher degree of market power is
also associated with higher productivity growth but not significantly associated with asset sales
or renovations activity.  Note,  however, that both  coefficients are positive,  suggesting that re-
structuring is enhanced if the enterprise has larger control of the market.  This may be because
such enterprises can finance renovations through internally generated resources, and also because
they are in a better position to have assets valuable to other firms.
Some industry dummies are also significant in explaining enterprise restructuring.  Firms
operating in the Food and Beverage sector are associated with more rapid restructuring.  In con-
13trast, firms operating in the Metals sector tend to restructure less on all three measures.  The pat-
terns for other sectors are less pronounced, and frequently the coefficients change signs.  An ex-
ception is Chemicals, where the coefficients are always negative, albeit insignificant.  The secto-
ral coefficients suggest a pattern often reported in other firn-level  studies on transition - re-
structuring is less rapid in the heavy industry sectors.
5.  Conclusions
Using a stratified random sample of insider-controlled firms in Georgia and Moldova, we
uncover an interesting stylized fact: restructuring is more rapid in enterprises bought-out by their
managers  as compared  to  enterprises privatized  through  voucher  auctions where  the  control
(direct  or  indirect)  remains  with  their  managers.  We  suggest  that  this  may  be  due  to  the
perception on the part of managers that ownership acquired through voucher privatization is a
windfall gain. Further research is, however, necessary to help explain these findings and provide
a consistent theoretical framework.
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